Friday, September 2, 2016
my Air Jordan 1 "Almost Banned" custom colorway
my Air Jordan 1 "Almost Banned" custom colorway
custom painted the Air Jordan 1 Mid Black/Yellow-Wolf Grey into my "Almost Banned" colorway using Angelus Red paint.
Tuesday, August 30, 2016
The Unofficial (Tsuneishi Technical Services Phils.) TTSP Hymn
The Unofficial (Tsuneishi Technical Services Phils.) TTSP Hymn
Song & Lyrics by John Paul Claro Ladiao
Music by Randy Baracao
Composed on Autumn, 2005 in Midori-so, Tsuneishi, Numakuma, Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan
TTSP onward steer
TTSP onward gear
Colossal waves that splash onboard
Unify unto our fervent horde
and TTSP is sublime
Amidst the line of blinding sight
Astray into the desolate night
Propel us to the beacon light
Our flagship leads our righteous light
and TTSP is sublime
Feel the breeze upon the shores
And reminisce the ways before
The men who answered the call of design
Ships sail forth and brightly shine
and TTSP is sublime
and TTSP is sublime
Labels:
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Sunday, April 24, 2016
JULIAN E. TUASON v. LA PREVISORA FILIPINA G.R. No. L-44579, December 24, 1938
JULIAN E. TUASON v. LA PREVISORA
FILIPINA
G.R. No. L-44579, December 24, 1938
Corporation Law Case Digest by John Paul C.
Ladiao (15 March 2016)
(Topic: Consideration for Stocks and
Transfer)
FACTS:
Appellee
Juan E. Tuason had been a stockholder of the defendant and appellant, La
Previsora Filipina, Mutual Building and Loan Association, since 1929, having
acquired on different dates shares of stock thereof of the series M and C, at
the par value of P200 per share with a guaranteed dividend of 10 per cent. Plaintiff
acted as treasurer of defendant corporation from February 27, 1932, up to
February 1, 1933. On February 15, 1932, said plaintiff subscribed for 50,000
accumulative shares of series A, paying on account the sum of P5,000, value of
twenty-five shares subscribed and paid for by him, which he had exchanged for
the equivalent value of the aforesaid accumulative shares in accordance with
section 25 of the by-laws of the association. The corresponding certificate of
stock, which bears number 8463 (Exhibit 5), had been prepared by defendant
corporation and was dated February 15, 1932. On February 19, of the same year,
said defendant corporation addressed a letter (Exhibit 4) to plaintiff in which
it informed him that the certificate (Exhibit 5) issued by it in his favor for
50,000 accumulative shares of series A, bearing number 8463, remained at his
disposal in the office of said defendant where he might get the same when he so
desired.
On August 1,
1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue, after an investigation, discovered
that defendant had not affixed documentary stamps on the aforesaid certificate
No. 8463 in violation of section 1449 (b) of Act No. 2711, for which reason he
required defendant to pay P10,000 for documentary stamps (Exhibit 35). In view
of said demand, the board of directors of defendant corporation, by resolution
of August 4, 1932, agreed to pay the aforesaid amount.
Plaintiff
Juan E. Tuason having failed to pay the remaining installments on the price of
the 50,000 accumulative shares of series A, defendant corporation, by
resolution of its board of directors of November 10, 1932, declared said shares
forfeited in December, 1932.
On March 9,
1934, defendant corporation demanded of plaintiff, through the letter Exhibit
Q, the reimbursement of the sum paid by it for documentary stamps.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not plaintiff was bound to reimburse defendant corporation for the value of the
documentary stamps which the committee appointed by the Collector of Internal
Revenue has affixed to certificate No. 8463 for 50,000 shares of stock issued
in the name of said plaintiff?
HELD:
NO.
If the
obligation to pay the value of the documentary stamps which were affixed to the
certificate of stock — supposing that plaintiff had agreed with defendant corporation
to assume the same, which he, however, denies and no authentic evidence in the
affirmative has been shown — arises from the existence of said right, upon the
latter's disappearance, the former can not exist upon the principle that when
there is no cause there can be no effect. When more than one year after, or on
April 25, 1934, the committee appointed by the Acting of Internal Revenue
affixed to the stub Exhibit B of the said certificate No. 8463 the documentary
stamps in question and immediately cancelled them, plaintiff had no longer
anything to do with the shares of stock which represented said certificate, and
he can not now be made to answer for the payment of their value.
In view of
the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold: First that the mere making of
a certificate of stock in the name of the subscriber thereof by installments
and its signing by the officers of a mutual building and loan association,
without affixing thereto the corresponding documentary stamps, does not
constitute an issue of said certificate, notwithstanding the notice which the
secretary of said association might have sent to the said subscriber advising
him of its issuance and informing him that said certificate "was at his
disposal whenever he desired or had time to get it"; second, that a
subscriber of shares of stock in an association is not bound to pay the
documentary stamp tax required by law, unless he had agreed with the
association to assume payment thereof; and third, that even when there is such
an agreement, if before the issuance of the shares of stock the right of the
subscriber to the same is declared forfeited, said subscriber is likewise not
bound to pay said tax.
VICENTE SABALVARO v. ERLANGER & GALINGER, INC. G.R. No. L-43045, August 17, 1937
VICENTE SABALVARO v. ERLANGER &
GALINGER, INC.
G.R. No. L-43045, August 17, 1937
Corporation Law Case Digest by John Paul C.
Ladiao (15 March 2016)
(Topic: Consideration for Stocks and
Transfer)
FACTS:
The
defendant corporation accepted the services of the plaintiff, as its employee,
on April 16, 1920. A few months after the plaintiff had entered said
defendant's service — the record is silent as to the said date — the defendant
Feldstein, who was the vice-president thereof, offered to sell him the share
which had originally been issued in the name of Serapio Estabaya and
transferred by the latter to the corporation, for economic reasons. In view of
the fact that the plaintiff had no money available to pay for the value of the
share offered to him, which was P500, he by agreement with Feldstein signed a
promissory note for said amount, with the understanding that it would be paid
piecemeal with bonus thereafter to be given him monthly as dividends by the
corporation, which was so done although not completed.
When the
plaintiff voluntarily separated from the service of the defendant corporation
on February 17m 1933, he asked the latter and the officers thereof to purchase
his 10 shares in question as they previously purchased those of other
employees. He likewise asked them to pay him 7 per cent of the value of his
said shares, as interest, during the year 1932. He finally requested them to
commute his accrued leave by paying him the value thereof, as they previously
did to other employees of the corporation. He was granted nothing, however,
except authority to sell to whomsoever he wished, 7 said 10 shares which he had
in the corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not that the defendant corporation or its officer, who are the other
defendants, under obligation or not to purchase from the plaintiff his ten
shares of stock in the corporation, after the plaintiff separation from said
defendant corporation?
HELD:
NO.
It is
evident that in no contract may a contracting party be obligated to more than
what he has really bound himself and that the contract should not be construed
as including things and cases different from those with respect to which the
persons interested intended to contract (art. 1283, Civil Code).
The second
paragraph of Exhibit B which imposes upon the plaintiff the condition not to
sell the two shares stated therein without first obtaining authority from the
defendant Feldstein in the case said plaintiff should leave the employ of the
corporation, does not mean that there is obligation on the part of said
corporation, its officers or Feldstein himself to purchase from him the two
shares in question. It should be borne in mind that said shares were not
purchased by the plaintiff with his own money but with the dividend or profits
earned by the same.
This court
is of the opinion that the doctrine laid down in the case of Padgett vs.
Badcock & Templeton, Inc. and Babcock ([1933], 59 Phil., 232), is
applicable to the case at bar. In the absence of a contract, either express or
implied, providing for the acquisition by a corporation or its officers of the
shares of the stockholders thereof, they should not and cannot be obliged to
acquire them. Therefore the answer to be given to the first question raised by
the plaintiff must be in the negative.
Edward J. Nell Co. v. Pacific Farms Inc. G.R. No. L-20850, November 29, 1965
Edward J. Nell Co. v. Pacific Farms Inc.
G.R. No. L-20850, November 29, 1965
Corporation Law Case Digest by John Paul C.
Ladiao (15 March 2016)
(Topic: Merger/Consolidation)
FACTS:
On October
9, 1958, appellant secured in Civil Case No. 58579 of the Municipal Court of
Manila against Insular Farms, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as Insular Farms a
judgment for the sum of P1,853.80 — representing the unpaid balance of the
price of a pump sold by appellant to Insular Farms — with interest on said sum,
plus P125.00 as attorney's fees and P84.00 as costs. A writ of execution,
issued after the judgment had become final, was, on August 14, 1959, returned
unsatisfied, stating that Insular Farms had no leviable property. Soon thereafter,
or on November 13, 1959, appellant filed with said court the present action
against Pacific Farms, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as appellee — for the
collection of the judgment aforementioned, upon the theory that appellee is the
alter ego of Insular Farms, which appellee has denied. In due course, the
municipal court rendered judgment dismissing appellant's complaint.
The record
shows that, on March 21, 1958, appellee purchased 1,000 shares of stock of
Insular Farms for P285,126.99; that, thereupon, appellee sold said shares of
stock to certain individuals, who forthwith reorganized said corporation; and
that the board of directors thereof, as reorganized, then caused its assets,
including its leasehold rights over a public land in Bolinao, Pangasinan, to be
sold to herein appellee for P10,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not that the appellee, Pacific Farms is an alter ego of Insular Farms?
HELD:
NO.
We agree
with the Court of Appeals that these facts do not prove that the appellee is an
alter ego of Insular Farms, or is liable for its debts. The rule is set forth
in Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 15, Sec. 7122, pp. 160-161, as
follows:
Generally
where one corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to another
corporation, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the
transferor, except: (1) where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to
assume such debts; (2) where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or
merger of the corporations; (3) where the purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the selling corporation; and (4) where the transaction is
entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts.
Neither is
it claimed that these transactions have resulted in the consolidation or merger
of the Insular Farms and appellee herein. On the contrary, appellant's theory
to the effect that appellee is an alter ego of the Insular Farms negates such
consolidation or merger, for a corporation cannot be its own alter ego.
JOSE REMO, JR. v. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. L-67626, April 18, 1989
JOSE REMO, JR. v. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-67626, April 18, 1989
Corporation Law Case Digest by John Paul C.
Ladiao (15 March 2016)
(Topic: Consideration for Stocks and
Transfer)
FACTS:
In the
latter part of December, 1977 the board of directors of Akron Customs Brokerage
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Akron), composed of petitioner Jose
Remo, Jr., Ernesto BaƱares, Feliciano Coprada, Jemina Coprada, and Dario
Punzalan with Lucia Lacaste as Secretary, adopted a resolution authorizing the
purchase of thirteen (13) trucks for use in its business to be paid out of a
loan the corporation may secure from any lending institution.
Feliciano
Coprada, as President and Chairman of Akron, purchased thirteen trucks from
private respondent on January 25, 1978 for and in consideration of P525,000.00
as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. 6 In a side agreement of the same
date, the parties agreed on a downpayment in the amount of P50,000.00 and that
the balance of P475,000.00 shall be paid within sixty (60) days from the date
of the execution of the agreement. The parties also agreed that until said
balance is fully paid, the down payment of P50,000.00 shall accrue as rentals
of the 13 trucks; and that if Akron fails to pay the balance within the period
of 60 days, then the balance shall constitute as a chattel mortgage lien
covering said cargo trucks and the parties may allow an extension of 30 days
and thereafter private respondent may ask for a revocation of the contract and
the reconveyance of all said trucks.
The
obligation is further secured by a promissory note executed by Coprada in favor
of Akron. It is stated in the promissory note that the balance shall be paid
from the proceeds of a loan obtained from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) within sixty (60) days. 8 After the lapse of 90 days, private
respondent tried to collect from Coprada but the latter promised to pay only
upon the release of the DBP loan. Private respondent sent Coprada a letter of
demand dated May 10, 1978. 9 In his reply to the said letter, Coprada
reiterated that he was applying for a loan from the DBP from the proceeds of
which payment of the obligation shall be made.
In due time, private respondent filed
a compliant for the recovery of P525,000.00 or the return of the 13 trucks with
damages against Akron and its officers and directors, Feliciano Coprada, Dario
D. Punzalan, Jemina Coprada, Lucia Lacaste, Wilfredo Layug, Arcadio de la Cruz,
Francisco Clave, Vicente Martinez, Pacifico Dollario and petitioner with the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal. Only petitioner answered the complaint
denying any participation in the transaction and alleging that Akron has a
distinct corporate personality.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) erred in disregarding the corporate
fiction and in holding the petitioner personally liable for the obligation of
the Corporation which decision is patently contrary to law and the applicable
decision thereon?
HELD:
Yes.
The
environmental facts of this case show that there is no cogent basis to pierce
the corporate veil of Akron and hold petitioner personally liable for its
obligation to private respondent. While it is true that in December, 1977
petitioner was still a member of the board of directors of Akron and that he
participated in the adoption of a resolution authorizing the purchase of 13
trucks for the use in the brokerage business of Akron to be paid out of a loan
to be secured from a lending institution, it does not appear that said
resolution was intended to defraud anyone and more particularly private
respondent. It was Coprada, President and Chairman of Akron, who negotiated
with said respondent for the purchase of 13 cargo trucks on January 25, 1978.
It was Coprada who signed a promissory note to guarantee the payment of the
unpaid balance of the purchase price out of the proceeds of a loan he
supposedly sought from the DBP. The word "WE' in the said promissory note
must refer to the corporation which Coprada represented in the execution of the
note and not its stockholders or directors. Petitioner did not sign the said
promissory note so he cannot be personally bound thereby.
As to the
amendment of the articles of incorporation of Akron thereby changing its name
to Akron Transport International, Inc., petitioner alleges that the change of
corporate name was in order to include trucking and container yard operations
in its customs brokerage of which private respondent was duly informed in a
letter. 19 Indeed, the new corporation confirmed and assumed the obligation of
the old corporation. There is no indication of an attempt on the part of Akron
to evade payment of its obligation to private respondent.
There is the
fact that petitioner sold his shares in Akron to Coprada during the pendency of
the case. Since petitioner has no personal obligation to private respondent, it
is his inherent right as a stockholder to dispose of his shares of stock
anytime he so desires.
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